Security

Security at VERA

Last updated October 17, 2026

What is in place today, what is not yet, and how to report a problem. We state gaps plainly because a review that finds an undisclosed gap costs more trust than a disclosed one. A fuller Security & Trust Overview will be available to evaluating institutions on request once it has been brought up to date.

What is in place

AreaWhat we do
Sign-inTwo-step sign-in is required on every account, including VERA’s own operator accounts. Ten wrong passwords in a row lock a login for 15 minutes, and for longer on each repeat. Sessions are short (30 minutes by default, or one hour for people assigned to an active project team), fixed at sign-in, and never renewed silently.
ApprovalsEvery approval is signed with the approver’s own key. VERA never holds an approver’s private key or signing passphrase. Accounts are role-bound. VERA refuses a second approval from the same sign-in or the same signing key.
Encryption and keysConnections to the website, the app and the API use TLS. Bank routing and account numbers and authenticator secrets are encrypted by the application with AES-256-GCM before they are stored. Service secrets are held in Google Cloud Secret Manager, and the attestation-signing key is held in Google Cloud KMS.
Audit recordSign-ins, approvals, releases, reviews, refused actions and administrative changes are written to an audit log in which each entry carries a hash of the one before it, so a removed or reordered entry shows. Entries since October 7, 2026 can also be checked for altered content. The database refuses edits and deletes of log entries. Examiners get read-only access with CSV and PDF exports.
Public recordOnly a hash is published to a public ledger. No names, amounts, account numbers or documents. During the pilot the ledger is its test network.
BackupsA full copy of both databases is made every night and is set to be kept for 35 days in a private storage bucket outside the database provider (the first copies were made on October 5, 2026). A backup file has been restored into a clean database, and its tables and row counts matched production. The restore test used a newer database version than production.
MonitoringEach service is checked from outside every minute, from six locations. Alerts for a service going down, bursts of server errors, start-up failures and failed backup runs are emailed to the operator. The server-error alert fired during a test of the live service on October 9, 2026, and a failure caused on purpose on a temporary copy of a down alert sent its email on October 10, 2026. The failed-backup alert has not yet been fired by a real failed run.
Data locationUnited States: Google Cloud us-east1, and Neon (on Amazon Web Services us-east-1) for the database.

What is not yet in place

We will update this page when any of these changes.

Service providers

Google Cloud (hosting, key and secret management, backup storage), Neon (managed PostgreSQL), Cloudflare (DNS, edge and system email), and the public XRP Ledger (hash only). See the Privacy notice for what each can reach.

Reporting a security problem

Email security@verarails.com with “Security” in the subject line. Please include what you found, where you found it, and the steps to reproduce it. If you can, say how you would like us to credit you, or that you would rather not be named.

In scope: verarails.com, app.verarails.com and api.verarails.com.

Out of scope: testing against any customer’s live data; social engineering of VERA staff, customers or providers; physical attacks; denial-of-service or load testing; and the services VERA relies on (Google Cloud, Neon, Cloudflare, the XRP Ledger), which have their own programs.

What we ask: do not access, change or keep data that is not yours. Do not disrupt the service. Give us reasonable time to fix a problem before you disclose it publicly.

What we do: we read every report and reply. We aim to reply within 3 business days. We tell you when the problem is fixed. We do not run a paid bug-bounty program.